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A HISTORICAL APPROACH TO THE
CONTRACTUAL TIES THAT BIND PARTIES

TOGETHER
C.M.A. Mc Cauliff
No system of law, Roman, Anglo-American, or any other, begins
with even a small number of rules, principles, doctrines, or
generalizations of any kind .... They are all the creations of men,
proliferating like the leaves of the trees as population expands,
transactions multiply, conditions of life change, and the opinions of
men as to what makes for their welfare and survival also change.
INTRODUCTION

Professor Arthur L. Corbin, author of the now-classic treatise,
Corbin on Contracts, had a vision. He wanted to return reliance and
benefit conferred to the area of liability in contracts. In the period
leading up to the first Restatement of Contracts in 1932, many
prominent lawyers in the American Law Institute disagreed with
Corbin. They saw contract liability as limited to promises arising from
bargaining for future reliance. The concepts of reliance and benefit
conferred were therefore separated from the concept of consideration
in the first Restatement by different section numbers as fact patterns
without consideration. This division into separate sections of first and
second class liability has had profound consequences for contracts.
Although the other sections in the Restatement lead to liability (for
example, witness the use of section 90 on reliance), the separation into
different sections has given contracts liability a fragmentary quality
not overcome to this day. Society's decisions on what promises should
be enforced were diluted by the centrality the Restatement accorded
to the market model of the bargained exchange.
. A.B. Bryn Mawr College, M.A., Ph.D. University of Toronto, J.D. University
of
Chicago. The author wishes to thank Professor Perillo for his generosity in reading
drafts of this article with which he does not completely agree. The author also wishes
to thank George Conk, Adjunct Professor at Fordham Law School, and Michael
Risinger, Professor of Law at Seton Hall University School of Law. Any errors
remain the author's. For a study directed specifically to the period in which the
Restatements were being written, see Alfred S. Konefsky, Freedom and
Interdependence in Twentieth-Century Contract Law: Traynor and Hand and
Promissory Estoppel, 65 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1169 (1997).
1. Arthur L. Corbin, Sixty-Eight Years at Law, 13 U. Kan. L. Rev. 183, 186
(1964) [hereinafter Corbin, Sixty-Eight Years].
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While unbargained reliance and benefit conferred were
acknowledged, they were deemed inferior to the main thrust of the
Restatement which saw contractual promises as enforceable only
when they were the product of bargained-for consideration. Thus,
unbargained reliance and benefit conferred were relegated to the
status of exceptions. Contracts without consideration were to be
reluctantly enforced, and when they were enforced, it was only to
avoid injustice. Nevertheless, Corbin acquiesced to the Restatement,
which provided functional utility without theoretical unity. He
continued to hope that the Restatement would evolve in future
revisions to a more coherent position on liability. His conditional
acceptance is understandable. The Restatement brought complete
contractual liability fractured into different sections; without his
efforts, the Restatement would have provided theoretical contractual
liability only for reliance after mutual promises supported by
bargained consideration.
Perillo and Bender's volume on the formation of contracts in the
revised edition of Corbin's treatise adopts the Restatement's division,
which was not made in Corbin's original edition. Indeed, history and
the Restatements were good reasons for Perillo and Bender's taking
the route they did. Corbin would have appreciated these reasons,
although he may not have abandoned pursuit of a unified theoretical
contractual liability. This article explores the road not taken and
traces in general terms what Corbin might have wished to see if more
of the Restaters had agreed with him. Ironically, although American
contracts theory does not seem headed toward Corbin's desired unity,
the current English law of obligations does, covering contracts, torts,
and restitution influenced by the European Union.
Prosaic and serviceable, contracts remain at the center of our
personal, professional, and business arrangements. Reinventing itself,
the field of contracts adjusts over time to strike a more suitable
balance between parties. Contract theory encompasses not only
doctrinal clarity but is also concerned with a moral component.
Fairness to the parties is an important constituent in a contractual
relationship: one party should not be ruined in the interest of the
other receiving a windfall. Today, various serviceable theories tied to
the capital market and other utilitarian values support the centrality
of the bargained exchange. They reflect a narrowly focused view of
what a theory of contractual liability should be.
Corbin had a broader vision, based on reasonable expectations but
also reflecting equity, harkening back to the views of Lord Mansfield.2
In his day, Corbin saw the viability of reuniting discrete strands of
2. William Murray, first Earl of Mansfield (1705-93), is most noted for his work
in commercial law and unjust enrichment. His attempt in Pillans v. Mierop, (1765) 3
Burr. 1663, to treat consideration as evidentiary only was rejected in Rann v. Hughes,
(1778) 7 Term Rep. 346 n.a, 101 Eng. Rep. 1014 n.a (K.B.).
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contract law into a comprehensive concept of liability.' Corbin wished
to restore the more complete vision embodied in several of Lord
Mansfield's opinions. Starting in 1925, Corbin went about this selfappointed task by working on his treatise and the Restatement of
Contracts.4 Corbin realized that "the reasoning of common law lawyers
has preserved a way of argument already investigated in antiquity under
the name of rhetoric or dialectical reasoning. It was well known to
Roman jurists and throughout the middle ages until it waned with the
advent of Cartesian philosophy. '5 Thus, Corbin's analyses were based
on the premise that rules are fashioned to the times and embody both
change and continuity.' For that reason, Corbin, having retired in 1943,
continued to read the advance sheets for contracts cases until he was
eighty-nine.7 As becomes clear from reading Corbin's works, primary
emphasis on the bargain underlines the autonomy of the individual in
accordance with Enlightenment philosophy.
The principles of
promissory estoppel and benefit conferred add a corrective emphasis on
the relationships and obligations between parties to a contract arising
from the broad, inclusive definition of consideration as a reason for
contracting. The Restatement, however, kept these principles separate
from consideration by inserting them in different sections from that
which discussed consideration. We have kept them separate ever since.
Thus, Perillo and Bender start the Revised Edition of Corbin's treatise
on consideration from the point of view of the Restatements and not
with Corbin's argument for unity of liability.' Surely, Perillo and Bender
have taken the right approach. It is no more possible to use Corbin's
scheme today than it was when the first Restatement of Contracts was
3. Arthur Linton Corbin (1874-1967), one of the early teachers at Yale Law
School, wrote a classic treatise on contracts that continues to be in demand and is now
in the process of revision. Joseph M. Perillo is the general editor of the new edition of
Corbin on Contracts, published in a multivolume series by West starting in,1993 and
continued after Lexis acquired the treatise from West.
4. Friedrich Kessler, Arthur Linton Corbin, 78 Yale L.J. 517, 519 (1969). Corbin
also worked on the Revised Sales Act. In another context, Peter A. Alces, in Regret
and Contract "Science," 89 Geo. L.J. 143, 144 (2000), observes that "a unified theory
of contract would make sense of much of our jurisprudence. Such coherence is [a]
desideratum. Few matters of human engagement admit of a single animating theory
or principle ... much can be learned even in an ill-fated effort to discover the
underlying cause."
5. Kessler, supra note 4, at 523.
6. Arthur Corbin, Principlesof Law and Their Evolution, 64 Yale L.J. 161 (1954)
[hereinafter Corbin, Principles of Law].
7. Thomas W. Swan, Professor Arthur L. Corbin, Creator of the Present-Day
Yale Law School, 74 Yale L.J. 207, 208 (1964); cf Arthur Goodhart, Professor
Corbin's Eightieth Birthday, 71 Law Q. Rev. 201, 202 (1955) (noting that Corbin had
read more than 50,000 contracts decisions). For a fascinating picture of Corbin at
work in his later years, see Joseph M. Perillo, Twelve Letters from Arthur L. Corbin to
Robert BraucherAnnotated, 50 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 755 (1993).
8. Joseph M. Perillo & Helen H. Bender, 2 Corbin on Contracts (rev. ed.):
Formation of Contracts §§ 5.1-7.21 (1995) (dealing with consideration, while treating
contracts without consideration in a separate volume).
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being drafted and adopted.
What makes a contract binding depends, for the most part, on the
time period in which the transaction took place. Procedural, societal,
and political climates, changing through the centuries, have shaped and
molded contract doctrines so that whether a contract is considered
binding needs to be determined in the context of the era in which the
agreement was made. Despite these surface differences and some
philosophical division about what should be deemed a contractual
relationship, the nature or essence of contract-what we may call the
contract morality question-has persisted through the centuries. The
battle has not been about contract doctrines, such as offer and
acceptance, but has been about things of human value, a broader
understanding of what contract means.
The nineteenth-century
alternative route to contract through equitable concepts exemplifies this
struggle. Categories of human interaction that arise out of these
concepts are conceived on a broad scale and include different positions
along the spectrum of economic transactions, which embody the basic
policies for awarding damages.
These equitable concepts include bargain, reliance, benefit conferred,
and consideration. They are often expressed in philosophical and
sometimes in Aristotelian terms to relate fundamental interests of
justice for the identification of situations that are categorized as
contractual.'
Bargain assumes the contemplation of an exchange
between two parties; reliance confusingly refers to both bargained and
unbargained detriment; benefit again may mean either a bargained or an
unbargained exchange, although benefit conferred has come to refer
only to an unbargained exchange; and consideration expresses the
reason the two parties had for getting together. These are the ties that
bind the parties together.
To sketch the historical development of the ties that bind, we begin
with the old writ system and forms of action accompanied by the
considerations of justice inhering in and informing the writs with
underlying societal notions of civil liability. The shared learning of prior
9. Lon L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract
Damages (pt. 1), 46 Yale L.J. 52, 56-57 (1936). There are of course other formulations
of twentieth-century contract development and other histories of how we got there.
For example, Richard Craswell focuses on the assessment of damages, not the parties'
respective interests when the contract was formed. Richard Craswell, Against Fuller
and Perdue, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 99 (2000). Among modern priorities, Craswell cites
economic efficiency and retributivist and distributional goals as considerations that do
not always coincide with Fuller and Perdue's classification. Id. at 109-21. For an
earlier example, during the nineteenth century, Langdell and Holmes wanted to shape
the category of contract, not by synthesizing all the relevant ties that could bind
contractually, but by saying this one principle embodying the bargained-for-exchange
case amounted to a contract. That view influenced the development of contract law,
and, as a result, promissory estoppel was created to allow recovery when Langdellian
contract liability was denied. Again, if some large-scale merchants were helped by
narrow liability rules other small-scale merchants were hurt by the narrower scope.
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writers shows us that during the writ period, several different procedures
existed to service economic transactions and recover money, including
the writs of debt, covenant (contract under seal), and assumpsit (an
undertaking of an obligation). While no unified theory of contracts
existed to knit together all the concepts covering contractual liability
among the writs, many methods were available for recovering damages.
Corbin's vision of unity can be most easily linked to the eighteenthcentury cases that Lord Mansfield decided from the viewpoint of moral
obligation. The three strands of consideration -detriment, benefit, and
mutual assent-had come together by the end of the sixteenth century,
working flexibly as a loose theory accommodating many types of
contractual transactions. This loose theory was linkable to principles of
Aristotelian justice, until a shift in the nineteenth century moved the
focus to offer and acceptance, thereby excluding many consensual
transactions from the purview of contract and disassociating many of the
ties that had formerly succeeded in binding the parties. A partial theory,
however, emerged to guide notions of civil justice, and it was brought
directly to bear on contracts.
Many factors played a role in shaping the nineteenth-century view,
from Langdell's concerns for training young lawyers with simplified
concepts, to applying political theory, to the needs of large merchants.
For these various reasons, the scope of contracts was narrowed and did
not reflect the broader vision of civil obligation accompanying the writ
system. A general theory of contract liability emerged to replace the
various writs dealing with contract issues, but it was much less
comprehensive than the writs taken together. The effect was as though
the policies of only one of the writs - assumpsit -was made the limit of
contract. That narrow approach of confining contracts to the most
obvious situation left a large gap.
As the nineteenth century waned, the courts had simply left the old
bargain principle of consideration in place, and shifted the focus to
contractual procedures by concentrating on the assent principle of offer
and acceptance."0 The scope of contracts had become very narrow as
Mansfield's routes to contract became closed off from the common law
and were channeled into equity or quasi-contract. Intent and estoppel
were shunted to the equity side.1" Contract was reached solely through a
10. Stanley D. Henderson, Promissory Estoppel and Traditional Contract
Doctrine, 78 Yale L.J. 343, 366 n.123 (1969). In turn, offer and acceptance caused its
own difficulties. In L'Estrange v. F. Graucob Ltd., a cafe owner, persuaded to buy a
slot machine, signed a printed order form with disclaimer of all warranties in small
print, and was held to have assented. L'Estrange v. F. Graucob Ltd. [1934] 2 K.B. 394.
Karl N. Llewellyn observed that acceptance of a contract should not be extended to
cover acceptance of all conditions. Karl N. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition:
Deciding Appeals 370 (1960).
11. A.W. Brian Simpson, Innovation in Nineteenth Century Contract Law, 91 Law
Q. Rev. 247, 263 (1975). Offer and acceptance law became more important because a
number of problems arose when an accepted offer was later not acted on. Equitable
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bargained-for exchange after an offer and acceptance, and could no
longer accommodate the Mansfeldian notion of consideration that
encompassed both detriment and benefit conferred, unless the offer and
acceptance requirements had also been satisfied. The doctrine of
consideration was itself a reformulation: "Ironically, the rise of
assumpsit-the source of the need for the consideration doctrine-was
itself due to the inability of the then existing process-based writ system
to accommodate enforcement of informal, but serious promises." 2
Sometime later, during the twentieth century, reliance came to be seen
as a separate theory within contract while benefit conferred remained
under the rubric of quasi-contract. Reliance dealing with unbargained
detriment in consideration came to be called promissory estoppel, at
least informally.
These three ties that bind parties together form the proper subject
matter of contracts. The set of logical unitary principles of justice
underlies these arguably separate, or at least separable notions. We can
find cohesion in the concept of monitoring exchange relationships. This
article examines classical contract law and the protectionist stance it
took against placing liability on parties unless the parties had entered
into a bargained-for exchange. As such, contract was kept far from tort
by emphasizing the bargain, symbolized by the exchange of promises.
The classical scheme limited liability to situations involving the parties'
agreement beforehand to be bound. Finally, this article examines
contract doctrine from the viewpoint of philosophy of contract.13
CLASSICAL CONTRACT DOCTRINE

Before the nineteenth century, no single body of rules applied to all
contract transactions. 4 Indeed, during most of the long history of
contracts we had neither much contract law nor theoretical discussion

estoppel turned out to be the old detriment consideration with a new name. For a
discussion of Christopher Columbus Langdell's case method of teaching, see Forum.
That Impecunious Introvert from New Hampshire: Re-Imagining Langdell, 17 Law
and Hist. Rev. 57-159 (1999).
12. Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 269, 290
(1986).
13. While several commentators have different basic approaches for their
difficulties with promissory estoppel, their philosophical approaches to contracts also
differ. See, e.g., Patrick S. Atiyah, Consideration in Contracts 55-59 (1971)
[hereinafter Atiyah, Consideration]; Charles Fried, Contract as Promise: A Theory of
Contractual Obligation 9-10, 16, 56 (1981) [hereinafter Fried, Contract as Promise];
Atiyah, Consideration and Estoppel. The Thawing of the Ice, 38 Mod. L. Rev. 65
(1975) [hereinafter Atiyah, Considerationand Estoppel]; Charles Fried, The Rise and
Fall of Freedom of Contract, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1858,1862-68 (1.980) [hereinafter Fried,
Freedom of Contract] (reviewing Patrick S. Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of
Contract (1979)).
14. Patrick S. Atiyah, The Rise And Fall of Freedom of Contract 400 (1979)
[hereinafter Atiyah, Rise and Fall]; David J. Ibbetson, A Historical Introduction to
the Law of Obligations 10 (1999).
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about contract law.15 To see the unity of contracts in the writ system we
must look not at each separate writ but at the cultural assumptions and
world view that informed the scheme of forms of action and writs. The
operation of contracts before the nineteenth century was largely hidden
from our eyes by the "uncontrolled discretion of juries, ' ' "6 thereby
obviating judicial opinions addressing these questions.
A. A HistoricalPerspective on Consideration
Consideration has been described as "just the label on a package
containing many of the separate rules about the liabilities which may
arise in the context of a transaction."17 But that label has kept in balance
the disparate elements in the package of contract relationships. 8 Corbin
attacked the principle that consideration is a clear-cut term and that
courts should therefore apply only deductive reasoning in determining
whether there is consideration. He instead argued that a set definition
of consideration had never been indispensable, and that the real
question for a court is one of social policy, namely, whether in this case
there is a good reason to enforce this promise. 9 Corbin further noted
that the Restatement set forth a much narrower definition of
consideration than common usage of that period would have allowed
15. John H. Baker, From Sanctity of Contract to Reasonable Expectation?, 32
Current Legal Probs. 17, 20-21 (1979) [hereinafter Baker, Reasonable Expectation].
Brian Coote traces the phrase "reasonable expectations" to Adam Smith's Lectures on
Jurisprudence 93 (R.L. Meek et al. eds., 1978): because intent was too subjective,
reasonable expectation, by referring to external standards, appraised the promisee's
inducement. Brian Coote, The Essence of Contract (pt. 1), 1 J. Cont. L. 91, 103 (1988).
Joseph M. Perillo updates Corbin's use of reasonable expectation, noting the growth
of reliance. Joseph M. Perillo, 1 Corbin on Contracts § 1.1, at 2-4 (rev. ed. 1993). The
language of section 90 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts is, however, also
couched in terms of reasonableexpectation: "[a] promise which the promisor should
reasonably expect." Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90(1) (1981). Anthony
Mason and Stephen J. Gageler use the phrase "reasonable perspective on contract" in
the same way as an earlier culture may have used natural law to describe "the
continuing responsiveness of legal institutions to varied and changing social need."
The Hon. Sir Anthony Mason & S. J. Gageler, The Contract, in Essays on Contract 34
(Paul D. Finn ed., 1987).
16. Baker, Reasonable Expectation, supra note 15, at 20.
17. Stroud F.C. Milsom, Historical Foundations of the Common Law 356-60 (2d
ed. 1981).
18. Cf. Lon L. Fuller, Considerationand Form, 41 Colum. L. Rev. 799, 801 (1941).
19. Arthur L. Corbin, Recent Developments in the Law of Contracts, 50 Harv. L.
Rev. 449, 453 (1937) [hereinafter Corbin, Recent Developments].
The fact is that the function of the courts is not to create a
definition and a rule and then to apply them mechanically and
dogmatically by a process of severe deductive logic; instead, it is to
determine whether a sound and sufficient reason exists for the
enforcement of the promise. When the court finds such a reason, it
cheerfully calls it a sufficient consideration. The real question for
the courts is what promises shall be enforced, not what is a
sufficient consideration.
Id. at 454.
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and, indeed, than many courts did allow. The Restatement definition
required that the subject of the contract be "bargained for and given in
exchange for the promise" thereby excluding past consideration, moral
obligations, and actions stemming from the promisee's reliance as just
reasons for finding sufficient consideration. Corbin observed that,
nevertheless, many courts across the country continued to enforce
promises based on past consideration and reliance, universally calling
these reasons "consideration" or proxies for consideration.2 "
The doctrine of consideration has, for the most part, remained the
same since the seventeenth century, but the uses to which it was put and
its importance in contract law have changed as contract law has
reinvented itself over the centuries.2
Reliance was an essential
ingredient in the development of consideration as "the keystone" of
traditional contract law.22 Both benefit and detriment worked within the
fully developed notion of consideration, because one or the other had to
be present for the requirements of consideration to be satisfied.
The early law compensating a promisee who had suffered a loss by
relying on an unfulfilled promise was "superseded in the 16th century by
the concept of bargain or exchange and the protection of disappointed
20. Corbin concentrated on the historical development of the law through
society's formulation of working rules over long periods of time, using consideration
as an illustration of the slow development of the law of contracts. Id. at 453-57.
Corbin took the trouble to show that although Justice Oliver W. Holmes had a
narrow definition of consideration, his was a minority judicial view:
According to judicial opinions, there are many past transactions,
never bargained for by the promisor, that are sufficient to make his
promise binding. Also, there are very many cases that hold that a
promise may become binding by reason of action by the promisee
in reliance on the promise, even though such action was never
bargained for by the promisor. Also, in a considerable number of
states, a preexisting moral obligation is a sufficient reason for the
enforcement of a subsequent promise to perform it. All of these
various reasons for enforcing the promise are almost universally
called "consideration" and are held to be sufficient to make the
promise binding.
Id. at 454. For a recent treatment of some of these cases, see Kevin M. Teeven, The
Advent of Recovery on Market Transactions in the Absence of a Bargain,39 Am. Bus.
L. 289, 362-71 (2002).
21. lbbetson, supra note 14, at 203.
In its essentials, the fundamental shape of contractual liability fixed
by the beginning of the seventeenth century was little different
from the medieval model of exchange: there had to be an
agreement; there had to be consideration, in the sense that the
transaction had to be broadly reciprocal; and only the parties to the
agreement were affected by it.
This model underpinned
contractual thinking through the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries, though it was only around 1800 that it was given any
more detailed articulation.
Id. (footnote omitted).
22. Fuller, supra note 18, at 810-12.
23. Edwin W. Patterson, An Apology for Consideration, 58 Colum. L. Rev. 929,
933 (1958).
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expectations. "24
Corbin emphasized that reliance was not a new
development when it was incorporated into the Restatement of
Contracts but had persisted since the time the writ of assumpsit was
used. 25 By the beginning of the seventeenth century, assumpsit became
the contract action par excellence. Reliance remained at the core of
assumpsit and consideration reflected that reliance in the concept of
detriment.26
Meanwhile, benefit, which eventually became another element of
24. Kenneth C.T. Sutton, Promises and Consideration,in Essays on Contract 35,
45 (Paul D. Finn ed., 1987).
25. "The present writer believes that the rule [in section 90 of the Restatement of
Contracts] is substantially in harmony with judicial decisions going back to the very
origin of the action of assumpsit. If this belief is correct, the rule is not a new
development." Corbin, Recent Developments, supra note 19, at 456. The rise of
consideration roughly occurred as follows: consideration first appeared in English legal
literature during the fifteenth century as a vague notion reflecting reliance in the form of
detriment. Gradually the writ of assumpsit emerged as the most useful and general
vehicle for litigating contract questions. Assumpsit allowed enforcement of informal
contracts when injury occurred to a person or to the property of one who justifiably
relied on the undertaking of another. Samuel J. Stoljar, A History of Contract at
Common Law 37-38 (1975) (noting that motive induced the promisee to rely); James
B. Ames, The History of Assumpsit, 2 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 53 (1888). By the end of the
fifteenth century, a litigant could bring an action in assumpsit for nonfeasance if she had
paid for something that then was not done. John H. Baker, An Introduction to English
Legal History 384-86 (3d ed. 1990) [hereinafter Baker, English Legal History].
The notion here was not so much that the promise should be
enforced, for the promise in itself was not actionable, but that the
damage incurred in reliance on the word of another should be
restored.... It was also a principle of moral philosophy, closely
akin to the modern doctrine of promissory estoppel.
Id. at 386. Assumpsit was an attempt to create a remedy for those who suffered loss by
relying on promises not enforceable in themselves. Baker, Reasonable Expectation,
supra note 15, at 25-26; see also Sutton, supra note 24, at 40. As Corbin was well
aware, the measure of damages in assumpsit was reliance. 1A Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin
on Contracts: A Comprehensive Treatise on the Working Rules of Contract Law §
205, at 238-40 (1950) [hereinafter Corbin, Contracts]. Assumpsit emphasized
prepayment (pro quandam pecuniae summa-for a certain sum of money paid to him
beforehand), consequential damages, and a notion of good faith in promising
(fideliter- faithfully).
26. For example, in some of the earliest cases, which involved construction contracts,
the homeowner engaged a contractor who promised to come and do the job. The courts
distinguished between a promise to build and a promise to repair a roof. No action lay in
the first situation because no harm was done to existing structures. The would-be
homeowner's reliance was not apparent. In the roof-repair case, however, the
contractor's failure to do the work foreseeably resulted in possible rain damage to
furniture or the structure itself because while the homeowner relied on one builder, it
became too late to avoid damage by engaging another builder who might actually have
done the work. The court's basis for granting recovery was promissory estoppel but
without the use of that terminology. Thus, the tort of deceit "meant nothing other than
that a person had been disappointed in expectations founded on the conduct of another."
Baker, Reasonable Expectation, supra note 15, at 25 (citing the Watkins case (1425),
reprinted in John H. Baker & Stroud F.C. Milsom, Sources of English Legal History:
Private Law to 1750, at 380-83 (1986)); see also 2 The Reports of Sir John Spelman, in
94 Selden Soc'y 269-70 (John H. Baker ed., 1978); cf. Milsom, supra note 17, at 32732.
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consideration, had been developing separately. For example, when a
seller of land accepted a down payment and then sold her land to
another purchaser, presumably for more money, the disappointed
purchaser complained that the seller "craftily schemed" to defraud the
purchaser of the land. The concept of exchange, quid pro quo,
persuaded the court to permit the purchaser to recover in assumpsit
against the defaulting seller, because the purchaser had paid the seller
for her land. Assumpsit recognized the reciprocal nature of a bargain
and permitted reciprocity of remedies. 7 Consideration acted as the
element of exchange that effected the passing of property and was the
reason why a promise was actionable.2"
During the sixteenth century, both meanings appeared together in
assumpsit, and consideration rose to prominence as the analogue of the
canonist doctrine of causa, which medieval chancellors used to mean
good grounds for a promise. 9 In the seventeenth century, the courts did
not focus on the acceptance of an offer because consideration was what
made the promises binding, indeed even finding it reasonable to infer
the promises in a bargain and sale situation."' In the seventeenth
century, consideration meant "all those requirements which were
necessary in... special pleading."'" Those requirements had plaintiffs
forego the general issue in favor of stating every matter they felt
necessary to their action. Bargain was overshadowed in the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries by notions of natural law and moral obligation.
This understanding did not last. Lord Mansfield, the Chief Justice of
the King's Bench,32 had tried to bring equitable considerations to bear
on contract law. Mansfield's philosophy of contracts was based on
27. John H. Baker stated that "the consideration in indebitatus assumpsit never
was the quid pro quo of the debt-creating contract, but was either the indebtedness
itself or something collateral (such as the fictional shilling, or a forbearance)." J. H.
Baker, Origins of the "Doctrine" of Consideration: Essays in Honor of Samuel E.
Thorne, 1535-85, in On the Laws and Customs of England 336, 355 (Morris S. Arnold
et al. eds., 1981) [hereinafter Baker, Origins]. As Richard Hooley observed, "[tihe
cases based on an action in assumpsit and those in debt may have different historical
origins but they are now intimately linked in the theory and public policy which seek
to justify them." Richard Hooley, Consideration and the Existing Duty, J.Bus. L. 19,
21 (1991).
28. Baker, Origins,supra note 27, at 352-54.
29. W.T. Barbour, The History of Contractin Early English Equity, in IV Oxford
Studies in Social and Legal History 59-65 (P. Vinogradoff ed., 1914); David J.
Ibbetson, Assumpsit and Debt in the Early 16th Century: The Origins of the
Indebitatus Count, 41 Cambridge L.J. 142 (1982).
30. Simpson, supra note 11, at 258. As examples of intent not to perform during
the seventeenth century, Simpson cites Lea v. Exelby, (1602) Cro. Eliz. 888, and
Pordage v. Cole, (1669) 1 Williams Saund. 319. See id. For various seventeenthcentury developments in consideration and contract law, see Kevin M. Teeven, A
History of Anglo-American Common Law of Contract 65-111 (1990).
31. Theodore F.T. Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law 655 (5th ed.
1956).
32. Lord Mansfield (William Murray) was Chief Justice of the King's Bench from
1756 to 1788.
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principles symbolized by two phrases from one of his opinions.33 The
"ties of conscience upon an upright mind" constituted a sufficient
consideration which allowed promises to be honored while "the honesty
and rectitude of a thing" permitted equitable obligations of payments to
be met. Mansfield's opinion contains this famous language:
Where a man is under a legal or equitable obligation to pay, the law
implies a promise, although none was ever actually made. A fortiori,
a legal or equitable duty is a sufficient consideration for an actual
promise. Where a man is under a moral obligation, which no Court
of Law or Equity can enforce, and34 promises, the honesty and
rectitude of a thing is a consideration.
Lord Mansfield played "a notable part in the absorption of ideas and
principles from without the common law."35 In a reaction against the
views that Mansfield held, bargain came into vogue again during the
nineteenth century. While Mansfield wanted to get rid of consideration
in favor of enforcing agreements, the bargain theory was devised for the
opposite purpose, namely to prevent the enforcement of some
agreements that did require consideration.
By 1840, much of Mansfield's vision of consideration was lost. 36 The
bargainers in the market in this half-industrialized age 37 seemed not to
know how to accommodate open-ended moral obligations common in
Roman law3 and ecclesiastical law. 39 The nineteenth-century jurists
who reacted against Mansfield emphasized the "will theory" (the
consent of the parties to the contract), the bargaining process, and
freedom of contract, which they expected would provide a solution to
society's industrial and social problems." Indeed, consent was often the
33. Hawkes v. Saunders, (1782) 1 Cowp. 289, 290, 98 Eng. Rep. 1091 (K.B.).
Mansfield also wrote that the "ties of conscience upon an upright mind are a sufficient
consideration." Id.
34. See, e.g., Eastwood v. Kenyon, (1840) 11 Ad. & El. 438, 113 Eng. Rep. 482. In
this case, a minor, whose guardian advanced money to take care of the minor,
promised after attaining majority to repay the money. Id. at 438-40. Chief Justice
Lord Denman found "no consideration but a past benefit not conferred at the request
of the defendant." Id. at 452.
35. Sutton, supra note 24, at 45.
36. James C. Oldham, Reinterpretationsof 18th-Century English Contract Theory:
The View from Lord Mansfield's Trial Notes, 76 Geo. L.J. 1949, 1962 (1989), reprinted
in J. Oldham, 1 The Mansfield Manuscripts and the Growth of English Law in the
Eighteenth Century 213,224 (1992).
37. Kevin Teeven, Mansfield's Reform of Consideration in Light of the Origins of
the Doctrine, 21 Mem. St. U. L. Rev. 669, 699 (1991).
38. Peter B. H. Birks, English and Roman Learning in Moses v. Macferlan, 37
Current Legal Prob. 1 (1984) (stating that the quasi-contractual doctrine of "money
had and received" had its remedial roots in civil law); see also Alfred Thompson
Denning, The Recovery of Money, 65 Law Q. Rev. 37 (1949).
39. Richard Helmholz, Assumpsit and Fidei Laesio, 91 Law Q. Rev. 406, 418-21
(1975) (fideo laesio in ecclesiastical law may have given rise to common-law language
reflecting this breach of faith in assumpsit).
40. Atiyah, Rise and Fall, supra note 14, at 614; see also Charles Fried, Contract as
Promise: A Theory of Contractual Obligation 16 (1981); Elizabeth Mensch, Freedom
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only ancient jurisprudential concept the will theorists retained, but
without the accompanying explanations of why the will of the parties to
a contract should be binding, such as the importance of promise
keeping, commutative (compensatory) justice, and the general context
of other Aristotelian virtues. 1
While the differences of opinion on the outcome of particular cases
may not have been very great, serious difficulty did arise for the will
theorists in explaining the results in the cases satisfactorily. 2 From the
perspective of civil law, the failure of the will theorists is interpreted as
the failure to find a commitment to do something for the promise in
their theory of promise, so that they could not explain why contracts are
binding. The will theorists "could not, for example, analyze whether an
offer had to be accepted. Instead, they packed the need for an
acceptance into their definition of contract and tried to extract from it a
conclusion as to when a contract was formed."43
Consideration had been a wider notion until the bargain theory cut it
down." Corbin noted that the definition of consideration was in a state
of disarray because courts were applying consideration in a way that
defied any meaningful or ascertainable definition of the term." Further,
he criticized the then draft definition of good consideration in section 75
of the Restatement of Contracts.46 He argued that this definition ("any
act or forbearance is a consideration if it was in fact bargained for and
given in exchange for a promise") was narrower than common usage
would have allowed at the time because courts held that "past
consideration" and "reliance" create sufficient consideration even
though no bargaining occurred. 7 Because the Restatement employed a
narrow definition, Corbin argued that consideration was no longer the
test for determining whether or not a promise is enforceable. In other
words, the bargained-for-exchange model had replaced the old
consideration with its balance between detriment and benefit. After
of Contractas Ideology, 33 Stan. L. Rev. 753 (1981) (book review); Samuel Williston,
Freedom of Contract, 6 Cornell L.Q. 365 (1921).
41. James Gordley, The Philosophical Origins of Modern Contract Doctrine 162
(1991) [hereinafter Gordley, Modern Contract Doctrine]; cf. David Charny, Nonlegal
Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 373, 382-83 (1990).
42. Gordley, supra note 41, at 181; Atiyah, Rise and Fall, supra note 14, at viii
(suggesting that the dominance of the bargained-for-exchange contract gives rise to
different results only in the small number of wholly executory contracts).
43. Gordley, supra note 41, at 233. Nevertheless, the seventeenth-century natural
lawyers may have contributed to these difficulties, insofar as they obscured the basis
of contractual obligation on the promisee's actual or probable reliance. For another
point of view see Patrick S. Atiyah, Essays on Contract 33, 80 (1986) [hereinafter
Atiyah, Essays on Contract].
44. Arthur L. Corbin, Some Problems in the Restatement of the Law of Contracts,
14 A.B.A. J. 652, 653-54 (1.928) [hereinafter Corbin, Problems in the Restatement].
45. Id. at 653.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
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that happened, unbargained detriment was excluded from contracts and
the benefit the promisor received had to move "from the promisee."49
In the new life of contracts, the elements in the older approach to
contracts were unbundled. The concept of benefit in consideration
remained part of the core of contract law, but was less important as the
focus on acceptance became central to the newly dominant bargain
theory.
Unbargained detrimental reliance, however, was not
immediately picked up in a new doctrine or procedure or given any role
in the new scheme. Therefore, detriment was left free floating. Reliance
now had a separate, if undercover, existence, serving an independent
function. By definition, then, reliance did not receive recognition in
contracts. Nevertheless, during the nineteenth century, unbargained
detriment continued to have an influence working unnoticed under the
guise of reasonable expectations: "Promissory estoppel is a means of
bringing about reasonable expectations; and, far from being a post-war
aberration, it enjoyed its finest hours in the Victorian House of Lords."5
The exiled unbargained detriment set about to recover its missing
constituents and replicate the severed doctrines under the respectable
pedigree of equity. Meanwhile the stripped down, but acceptable,
bargain theory of consideration also set out to regenerate the concepts
that it had lost. Together, like the uncauterized hydra, they gave us a
plethora of rich but confusing and arguably duplicative theories.
Thus, the doctrinal antecedents of promissory estoppel trailed along
with the old words "detriment" and "benefit" beside the new regime of
offer and acceptance in the bargain theory.5 When the narrower
concept of consideration could not cover enough fact patterns,
detriment was called into play. "Though not inevitable, it was
predictable that, instead of rejecting the estoppel notion and developing
the doctrine in accordance with its substantive basis, detrimental
49. Ibbetson, supra note 14, at 204.
50. Baker, Reasonable Expectation, supra note 15, at 29. Victorian equity cases
include: Dillwyn v. Llewellyn, (1862) 4 De G. F. & J. 517, 45 Eng. Rep. 1285 (holding
that expenditure on another's land in reliance was a promise); Yeomans v. Williams,
(1865) L.R. 1 Eq. 184; Hughes v. Metropolitan Railway (1877) 2 App. Cas. 439, [187480] All E. R. Rep. 187 (finding that waiver by conduct of claim to forfeit a lease
supported by consideration); Birmingham and District Land Co. v. London & N.W.
Railway Co., (1888) 40 Ch.D. 268, [1886-90] All E.R. Rep. 620 (noting that lessor
agreed to suspend tenant's obligation while the railway considered acquiring the
land); Fenner v. Blake, (1900) 1 Q.B. 426 (stating that variation of date for notice of
termination of lease generates its own consideration). Lord Justice Denning, as he
then was, commented on some of these cases as follows: "But strict legal rights are
always capable of being modified by the interposition of equity; .... The courts have
repeatedly invoked equitable principles so as to neutralise ill effects of the common
law doctrine of consideration." Alfred Thompson Denning, Recent Developments in
the Doctrine of Consideration, 15 Mod. L. Rev. 1, 4 (1952). For a view that places
promissory estoppel in the context of its earlier history, see K.C.T. Sutton,
Consideration Reconsidered, passim (1974).
51. Barnett, supra note 12, at 287-91. The courts did nothing to abolish the old
terminology but simply left it there with the new concepts of offer and acceptance.
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reliance, courts and scholars would permit the doctrinal antecedents to
persist in modified fashion.
The modern doctrine, therefore, is known as
'promissory estoppel.' ''52
B. Nineteenth-Century Concerns
The classical nineteenth-century depiction of a contract envisioned
two individuals of equal bargaining power, for example, the baker and
the wheat farmer voluntarily exercising their wills by exchanging their
promises to buy and sell wheat flour.5 3 This theory of the bargained-for
exchange emphasized the law of offer and acceptance and focused on
the moment of the contract's formation, which gave rise to the parties'
expectation rights. An offer is an "expression of willingness to contract
on specified terms, made with the intention that it shall become binding
as soon as it is accepted."54 Some flexibility in application tempers the
rigidity of the classical doctrine: "having committed itself to a rather
technical and schematic doctrine of contract, [the common law] in
application takes a practical approach, often at the cost of forcing the
facts to fit uneasily
into the marked slots of offer, acceptance and
55
consideration.
For classical contract law, offer and acceptance provided "the
moment of responsibility" which limited the scope of contract law "to
agreements for reciprocal performances," that is, to bargains or
exchanges of "equivalents."5 The commercial freedom to sell on the
52. John E. Murray, Murray on Contracts § 66, at 312 (4th ed. 2001). Professor
Perillo shows how Corbin was associated with the proposal to add promissory
estoppel to the Restatement as a basis of contractual liability: Corbin wrote that
Williston "often said that § 90 was my Section; but the fact is that it is now in exactly
the form in which he first submitted it. Every other advisor opposed it; but we
bludgeoned them until they seemed to be convinced." Perillo, supra note 7, at 768-69;
see also Daniel J. Klau, Note, What Price Certainty? Corbin, Williston, and the
Restatement of Contracts, 70 B.U. L. Rev. 511 (1990).
53. Atiyah, Rise and Fall, supra note 14, at v-vii; Mensch, supra note 40, at 755-56,
760. The possibility of successive deals played no part in classical analysis, and each
deal was considered in splendid isolation.
54. Guenter H. Treitel, The Law of Contracts 8 (10th ed. 1999).
55. New Zealand Shipping Co. Ltd. v. A.M. Satterthwaite & Co. Ltd., The
Eurymedon [1975] A.C. 154, 167, [1974] 1 All E. R. 1015, 1020 (stating that bill of
lading was an offer and the stevedore's unloading of the goods was sought as the quid
pro quo for the consignor's offer of exemption from liability for negligent unloading).
56. Atiyah summarizes classical contract theory as follows: "Classical theorists
insisted that contract law and the promise principle were the exclusive sources of the
rights and duties of the parties to a contract." Atiyah, Essays on Contract, supra note
43, at 138. Hugh Collins, The Law of Contract 45, 71 (1986), is the source of the first
two quoted phrases. The third quoted word is from Corbin, who recognized the
existence of "many agreements that are not bargains," which he defined narrowly as
"a definite exchange of equivalents, of a quid pro quo." Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin on
Contracts § 10, at 15 (1952). Michel Rosenfeld says that corresponding to the "shift in
what constitutes an enforceable promise is a shift in what constitutes a contract's most
crucial moment. Under the older law, the paradigm was the executed or partially
executed contract .... Under freedom of contract, on the other hand, the paradigm is
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market assumed great cultural importance, but the legal model of the
bargained-for exchange did not encompass the facts of all types of
commercial relationships. A leading American hornbook on contracts
indicates the enormity of the change in legal perspective since the
nineteenth century's exclusive adherence to bargained-for exchange:
The idea of "exchange" is central to the law of contracts, as it is to
any advanced economic system. Should it, however, set the
boundaries of the law of contracts? ... Twentieth century lawyers
seem less inclined to ideological dogmatism of any school and more
inclined to ask whether the community conscience would deem a
particular promise worthy of enforcement. Although the exchange
requirement still remains central to the law of contracts, lawyerinfluenced legislation and the development of the doctrine of
promissory estoppel dispense with the exchange requirement in a
number57 of instances. These instances will doubtless increase in the
future.

Over the years, many cases brought on a theory of contract have shown
that the concept of a market can be limiting and unserviceable when
applied in literal terms to the law outside its natural milieu in economics.
In preclassical contract theory, promises were deemed to have been
made in order to "enable the promisor to direct his actions in advance to
the benefit of another person. ' '58 In Charles Fried's conception,
however, promise has to be reciprocal rather than altruistic." The
perhaps contradictory values of trust and individual autonomy make
promise important." Fried invokes the rationale of the eighteenthcentury German philosopher Immanuel Kant for defining promise as "a
way of enlarging the scope of one's will, by allowing one morally to bind
oneself effectively so that what is promised for the future can be counted
among the present possessions of the promisee."61
Before the nineteenth century, the model for binding a promise
concerned an obligation that the promisor was already required to
perform. In the earlier period, "the promise did not create the

the executory contract .... " Michel Rosenfeld, Contract and Justice: The Relation
Between ClassicalContract Law and Social Contract Theory, 70 Iowa L. Rev. 769, 82223 (1985).
57. John D. Calamari & Joseph M. Perillo, The Law of Contracts § 4.3, at 172 (4th
ed. 1998).
58. Gordley, Modern Contract Doctrine, supra note 41, at 233.
59. Fried, Contract as Promise, supra note 13, at 39. Compare Herbert L.A. Hart,
Are There Any NaturalRights?, in Political Philosophy 53, 61 (A. Quinton ed., 1967),
who, as a moderate positivist, looked to reciprocity. When two parties enter a
contract, and so restrict their liberty, each party has the right to expect the other party
to be similarly bound for their mutual benefit.
60. Fried, Contract as Promise, supra note 13, at 16.
61. Fried, Freedom of Contract, supra note 13, at 1863 n.15 (citing I. Kant,
Metaphysical Elements of Justice: Part I of the Metaphysics of Morals 248-49 (J.
Ladd trans., 1965)).
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obligation, but merely confirmed its existence."62 Once the classical
theory of freedom of contract came into vogue, a promise to perform a
pre-existing obligation was no longer generally enforceable.63 "While
the positive school drew a sharp line between positive law on the one
hand and morals and ethics on the other, the advocates of the will theory
saw in law a rational means of attaining a spiritual end through the
freedom of the will. '
Therefore, it was not surprising that secular
lawyers in the nineteenth century placed great emphasis on contract as
fostering individual freedom."
The notion of autonomy, however, causes a problem for the classical
contract because, in some root sense, one is only bound as long as one
wishes to be bound. According to the most literal interpretation, once
one no longer wishes to be bound, there is no more freedom for that
party if she is held to her prior contract. Therefore, under the aegis of
freedom of contract, it is difficult to find that a contract had been made
at all, and the moment when each party promised the other assumed
heightened significance. As many situations as possible were excluded
from the ambit of contract, and offer and acceptance doctrine protected
freedom from contract so that a party was not charged with contractual
liability unless that party clearly wished to enter into a contract.66 On
balance, historical studies indicate that consideration was used in
nineteenth-century America to control and facilitate market
transactions.67 In a sense, if one party later changed his or her mind
after a firm offer, the classic view often protected that moment from
consequences, by finding that no contract had ever been made.
C. Reliance to One's Detriment: Reprise on Pre-Classical
Consideration
Consideration "means a reason for the enforcement of a promise," or
in Atiyah's broader gloss on this definition, consideration is "a reason

62. Rosenfeld, supra note 56, at 822; see also Atiyah, Rise and Fall, supra note 14,
at 141-43.
63. Rosenfeld, supra note 56, at 822 (citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts §
73 (1979)).
64. David H. Parry, The Sanctity of Contracts in English Law 17 (1959).
65. Id. at 18.
66. Richard E. Speidel, An Essay on the Reported Death and Continued Vitality of
Contract, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 1161, 1179-81 (1975) (book review); cf. Hart, supra note 59,
at 61. Hart expects that if one party to a contract is willing to submit to the contract,
that party has a right to expect the other party similarly to submit to the contract. Id.
This point concerns mutual cooperation rather than individual autonomy and the
scope of the right to change one's mind. Murray Rothbard finds that promising
restricts autonomy, and, taking the premise to its logical conclusion, agreements
beyond transfers of property should be unenforceable. Murray Rothbard, The Ethics
of Liberty 133-48 (1982).
67. Speidel, supra note 66, at 1170-71 (citing the work of Lawrence Friedman and
J. Willard Hurst).
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for the recognition of an obligation."68 A more neoclassical definition is
that consideration "is either some detriment to the promisee (in that he
may give value) or some benefit to the promisor (in that he may receive
value)."69 Promissory estoppel is not like old detriment consideration
but it is similar. Looking at the long sweep of the history of
consideration, one observer concluded,
Now it would be a distortion to claim that nothing has changed ....
My point is only that there remains a sufficient congruence for
mutual intelligibility. Christopher St. Germain [sic] would have
little difficulty in understanding the case of Central London
PropertiesLtd. v. High Trees House Ltd.; this is not an area in which

the basic principle has altered, perhaps because of the intimate
connection between the institution
of promising and a rationale in
70
terms of induced reliance.
In some sense, we want Christopher St. German who wrote in the
1520s and 1530s to be able to understand what we are doing today,
despite the many lives contract has had since that time. Similarly, we
look back on what lawyers did in the 1530s, as we try to keep some
continuity within our legal tradition." Over time, a number of different
definitions of consideration were held adequate to support an action for
breach of promise. In the later use of consideration, there was a single

68. Atiyah, Essays on Contract, supra note 43, at 182, 183. Compare Karl N.
Llewellyn, What Price Contract.An Essay in Perspective, 40 Yale L.J. 704, 741 (1931)
(noting that consideration is "any sufficient justification for court-enforcement"), with
Treitel, supra note 54, at 66 n.31 (criticizing this working standard as too vague).
69. Treitel, supra note 54, at 64.
70. Simpson, supra note 11, at 249. In High Trees, Denning, J. dealt with reliance.
Central London Properties Ltd. v. High Trees House Ltd., 1947 K.B. 130; see also
Baker, Reasonable Expectation, supra note 15, at 25. He felt that nineteenth-century
contract law unnecessarily and unfairly restricted recovery because consideration had
been severely limited, and that an equity approach, which had originally arisen to
mitigate the injustices of strict rules, was again needed to rescue the common law
from inflicting injustice. High Trees, 1947 K.B. at 133-35. His approach left behind
the old terminology and started afresh with equity.
71. See Christopher St. German, Dialogue Between Doctor and Student,
reprinted in 91 Selden Soc'y 230 (Theodore F.T. Plucknett & John L. Barton eds.,
1974), which makes reference to the notion of reliance. Michael P. Furmston
explains,
The use of the word detriment, in particular, obscures the vital
transformation of assumpsit from a species of action on the case to
a general remedy in contract. So long as it remained tortious in
character, it was necessary to prove that the plaintiff had suffered
damage in reliance upon the defendant's undertaking. When it
became contractual, the courts concentrated, not on the
consequences of the defendant's default, but on the facts present at
the time of the agreement and in return for which the defendant's
promise was given.
Michael P. Furmston, Cheshire & Fifoot's Law of Contract 76 (13th ed. 1996). To the
same effect, Baker says that the delictual history and the substantive principles do not
fit in with consideration. Baker, Origins, supra note 27, at 357.
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technical doctrine.7 ' Historically, great common lawyers of all periods,
ranging from Bracton and Christopher St. German to Mansfield, have
incorporated general learning and wisdom into their thinking about, and
development of the law.73
Corbin looked back to the early availability of reliance, as did Robert
Braucher, a Reporter for the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, who
did not find the terminology of promissory estoppel helpful. Braucher
said, "the expression, 'promissory estoppel'... tends to confusion rather
than clarity. '74 Braucher also agreed with Fuller on the ancient heritage
of reliance.7 5 In light of Justice Braucher's criticism of the term
"promissory estoppel," we would expect the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts not to use promissory estoppel.
Indeed, the term is
mentioned in comment a to section 90 only to emphasize its historical
roots in the action of assumpsit which measured damages by the extent
of reliance injury, and not the value of the promised performance.
According to Corbin, promissory estoppel is not a term of much value
because estoppel is too "widely and loosely used."76 Reliance was
categorized among the "informal contracts binding without assent or
consideration" in sections 85-94. Besides reliance in section 90, promises
to pay debts barred by a statute of limitations or discharged by
bankruptcy or to perform a voidable duty were set forth. These
categories are reminiscent of the fact patterns in Mansfield's moral
obligation cases.
Corbin, writing about the new definition of
consideration in section 75 of the first Restatement, suggested that its
function was no longer to determine the enforceability of a contract.
Rather, section 75 now meant that'77"any consideration whatever is
sufficient to make a promise binding.
72. See Simpson, supra note 11, at 262.
73. For further discussion of Henry de Bracton (judge coram rege d. 1268), see H.
G. Richardson, Bracton: The Problem of His Text (1965); for the barrister
Christopher St. German (d. 1540), see supra note 71; for Mansfield's civil law learning
and historical background, see Christopher P. Rodgers, ContinentalLiterature and the
Development of the Common Law by the King's Bench: c. 1750-1850, at 188-89, in The
Courts and the Development of Commercial Law 161, 190 (Vito Piergiovanni ed.,
1987) and the text accompanying notes 35-39 supra.
74. Loranger Construction Co. v. E.F. Hauserman Co., 384 N.E.2d 176,179 (Mass.
1978). Samuel J. Stoljar cogently explains that "estoppel, notwithstanding its special
language suggesting a separate doctrine, turns out to be little more than a contractsupplementing exercise as it reveals an additional agreement not included in the
formal contract, or one which modifies the latter ...not having gone through the
usual offer and acceptance stages." Samuel J. Stoljar, Estoppel and Contract Theory, 3
J. Cont. L. 1,21-22 & n.97 (1990).
75. See Fuller & Perdue, supra note 9, at 70 & n.25 (1936) (noting that although
section 90 applies especially to non-commercial situations, the reliance interest was
protected at common law).
76. Corbin, Contracts, supra note 25, § 204, at 232-34, § 205, at 238-40.
77. Corbin, Problems in the Restatement, supra note 44, at 653. Corbin
summarized the position on consideration as a member of the Committee of Advisors
for the Restatement. It is worth reproducing extensively:
The term has been used in a great variety of ways for the past five
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There were no comments to section 90 in 1932. Since Braucher was
the Reporter in 1965 for the Restatement (Second), the ancient, more
inclusive notion of consideration, which had been dispossessed during
the nineteenth century, was restored. The symbolic point about
pedigree in comment a is made to assert the legitimacy of this broader
definition: the coat of arms, as it were, of section 90 is displayed at the
entrance hall in comment a to indicate the ancient lineage of reliance.
"When a promise is enforceable in whole or in part by virtue of reliance,
it is a 'contract,' and it is enforceable pursuant to a 'traditional contract
theory' antedating the modern doctrine of consideration."7 8 Braucher
carefully refrained from using the term promissory estoppel, which had
hundred years, and the definitions that have been suggested are far
from in agreement....
After a great deal of discussion, therefore, it was deemed
advisable to define consideration without reference to ...whether
or not it would be legally operative to make a promise binding. It
is, therefore, declared in Section 75 that any act or forbearance is a
consideration if it was in fact bargained for and given in exchange
for a promise. By this definition, the existence of "consideration"
no longer appears to be a test for determining whether or not a
promise has become an enforceable contract. Some considerations,
as so defined, are sufficient to make a promise binding and others
are not sufficient. Starting with this definition, however, the
Institute is able to say in the following Section that any
consideration whatever is sufficient to make a promise binding ....
It should be observed that the definition adopted in Section
75 is very considerably narrower than the usage of many courts and
text writers. It has been common enough to use the term "past
consideration," and also to say that subsequent action in reliance
upon a promise many constitute a sufficient consideration therefor.
It is obvious that the facts commonly described as "past
consideration" were never bargained for and given in exchange for
the subsequent promise. It is equally obvious that subsequent
action in reliance upon the previously made promise may not have
been bargained for and given in exchange for it ....It would not
be at all safe to say, however, that facts of these kinds have not
properly been held to make promises enforceable ....These
promises are enforceable, although nothing whatever is bargained
for in exchange for them.
Id. at 653-54. Finally, Corbin said that section 90 "is believed to be in substantial
harmony with the actual weight of judicial decision and with the interests and
convictions of the business community." Id. at 654.
78. Loranger, 384 N.E.2d at 179. The court below, in fact, had applied a
promissory estoppel theory to uphold the jury's award of damages. Loranger v.
Hauserman, 374 N.E.2d 306, 309-10 (Mass. App. 1978). Promissory estoppel had not
previously been accepted in Massachusetts as a basis for imposing contractual
liability. Id. at 308. Patrick S. Atiyah points out that the separate development of
promissory estoppel "obscures the very close similarity between promissory estoppel
and ordinary cases of consideration. For detrimental reliance seems to be the key to
promissory estoppel, and it is also, of course, one of the twin legs of the doctrine of
consideration itself." Patrick S. Atiyah, An Introduction to the Law of Contract 15354 (4th ed. 1989). The court in Greenstein v. Flatley, 474 N.E.2d 1130, 1134 (Mass.
App. 1985), observed that in Loranger, Justice Braucher disapproved of the
expression "promissory estoppel," but did not disapprove of the principle.
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been the name for reliance during its exile under classical theory.79
D. Analysis of Changes Before and After ClassicalContract Law
Scholars have responded to changes in classical contract law from two
basic perspectives, fairness and efficiency, by looking to the disciplines
of philosophy and economics to make sense out of the nineteenthcentury separation of consideration into bargain and reliance. There has
been an explosion of contract-theory scholarship throughout the
common-law world and in the European Union with treatises and
comparative work.' A theory of historical development enables us "to
evaluate the relative suitability of legal practices for a particular
society."'"
Philosophy also looks to reasonable expectation (updated
Aristotelian reason) or to some deontological, duty-based theory as
Kantian autonomy or utility (the consequentialist Benthamite greatest
happiness for the greatest number), which Veatch has dubbed
collectively the desire-and-duty ethic. 2 As far as modern philosophy is
concerned, Rawls is the starting point for the duty to keep promises. 3
79. In Loranger, Justice Braucher ruled that in order to protect the reliance
interests of the promisee, the definition of consideration could include an inference of
a bargained-for-exchange. Loranger, 384 N.E.2d at 180. Justice Braucher noted that
there is a reciprocal relation between the promisee and the consideration in a typical
bargain. Id. at 180. The consideration induces the promisee to furnish the
consideration. Id. The parties do not need to be in equal control of the bargain, but
consideration is found if the promisor is, in effect, unilaterally setting the choices
available to the promisee. Although relying on a traditional common-law analysis,
Justice Braucher did not depart from the conventional definition of consideration and
expanded it to include an implied-in-fact inference. Justice Braucher's analysis
enlarged the definition of consideration to find a contract that classical, nineteenthcentury consideration would not have recognized. The Restatement (Second) of
Contracts § 71 (1981), describes consideration to include some right, interest, profit,
or benefit accruing to one part or some forbearance, detriment, loss, or responsibility
given suffered or undertaken by the other. Melvin A. Eisenberg observed that this
definition of consideration moves from the high ground of "general principle" to the
low ground of "particularized rules." Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Principles of
Consideration,67 Cornell L. Rev. 640, 642 (1982).
80. "The literature on the theory of contract is accumulating beyond the power of
an ordinary person to keep up with, let alone... understand all the distinctions
between the various lines of thought being pursued." L.J. Priestly, Contract- The
BurgeoningMaelstrom, 1 J. Cont. L. 15, 17 (1988). Common law and European legal
systems had greater occasion for interaction leading up to the Maastricht Treaty on
European Union, which became effective November 1, 1993. The Maastricht Recipe,
The Economist, Oct. 23, 1993, at 15. For examples of the cooperation and effort
among scholars internationally, see the continuing series Comparative Studies in
Continental and Anglo-American Legal History, especially volume 8, Towards a
General Law of Contract (John Barton ed., 1990); and Christian Larroumet,
Detrimental Reliance and Promissory Estoppel as the Cause of Contracts in Louisiana
and Comparative Law, 60 Tul. L. Rev. 1209 (1986).
81. David Lieberman, The Province of Legislation Determined: Legal Theory in
Eighteenth-century Britain 154 (1989).
82. Henry B. Veatch, For an Ontology of Morals 153-58 (1971).
83. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 342-45 (1971).
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This principle of allegiance to promise requires a morally compelling
connecting factor between the individual promisor and the duty to keep
promises. The three contract concepts of assent, reliance, and benefit
received are not by themselves strong enough connecting factors, and,
therefore, rights theorists posit a moral value in keeping promises.84 The
right to choose is itself important in liberal theory, but no one particular
choice is set forth as the best or a good in itself in the way Aristotle had
postulated an abstract concept of summum genus."
The major conceptions about the enforceability of promises have
revolved around either this notion of individual choice to assume an
obligation of recompense for harm incurred in reliance on a promise, as
Fuller advocated. 6 Before reaching a concept of personal responsibility
for contract, Fuller departed from the full implications of modern liberal
reliance theory to remain with the Aristotelian notion of distributive
justice, which corrects harm resulting from a disequilibrium in the
relationship between contracting parties.8 7 True liberalism involves both
moral autonomy and a balance of the conflicting economic liberty of
individuals.
Indeed, the concepts of agreement, consideration, and
what we recognize today as reliance, expectation, and benefit received,
or moral obligation, existed long before liberalism in its libertarian and
welfare guises emerged, as the records and voluminous literature on preliberal contract law abundantly show.89 Both reliance and expectation
have a much older history than liberal philosophy and fit in with
Aristotelian distributive justice rather than liberalism. Based on a
balance of individual economic liberties, liberalism, instead of referring
to expectation or reliance, would have circumscribed the scope of
autonomous individual action by reference to the need to respect the
liberty of others." Despite its strength, liberalism did not displace the
older remedial notions of reliance and expectation, which remain in
84. See Francis H. Buckley, Paradox Lost, 72 Minn. L. Rev. 775, 776, 778, 785
(1988).
85. Hugh Collins, Contractand Legal Theory, in Legal Theory and Common Law
136, 138 (W. Twining ed., 1986) (citing Rawls, supra note 83, at 31); Veatch, supra
note 82, at 103 n.3 (critiquing contemporary ethical theory from an Aristotelian
perspective). For the effect of the seventeenth-century scientific method, see Stephen
A. Siegel, The Aristotelian Basis of English Law: 1450-1800, 56 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 18
(1981). Apart from the language that gave rise to the legal concepts of equity,
distributive and commutative justice, and the division of civil obligation into tort and
contract, the Nicomachean Ethics is more generally known for the application of the
mean to the various virtues, the relation between external goods and the inward
happiness of the spirit, and the importance of habituation in moral development. Id.
at 43; see also Alisdair Mac Intyre, A Short History of Ethics 57-83, 98-99 (2d ed.
1998) (1966).
See generally The Symposia Read at the Joint Session of the
Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association at the University of Hull (1972).
86. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 9, at 56-57.
87. Id.; Collins, supra note 85, at 146.
88. Collins, supra note 85, at 146.
89. See supra notes 33, 38, 52 (citing works dealing with these concepts).
90. Collins, supra note 85, at 147.
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place.
Heirs of the philosophical and political economy of Jeremy Bentham
concentrate on efficiency and autonomy. For the operation of the
market, contract law has structured a set of institutions that compose the
market system of allocating goods and services in the economy.91 The
market place, according to the Aristotelian definition of exchange, was
not expected to provide exhaustive or perfect equality. As far as fair
exchange was concerned, natural law theory in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries figured the market broadly because value was not
precisely knowable." Since the market was a rough mechanism, there
was no need for more specific calibration. Need, scarcity, and cost were
reflected adequately at a range of prices, and the market was not
necessarily thought to be determinative of price or reflective of cost.
Adam Smith, by relying on the self-interest of each person to
constitute the common good, as expressed in free market distribution,
prepared the way for the utilitarians to erect an economic interpretation
of contract law. Today the behavior of the market itself is no more
precise, although we have better techniques for calculating its volatility.93
But the greater drawback of Benthamite market theory is that the
market does the assessments, and the law remains incidental because all
individual differences are standardized in a paradigm actor.94 The
current economic theorists refocused attention on traditional doctrines
of contract, tort, and property as the most efficient means of ordering
society and accommodating the market.9 5
Aristotle, in the Nicomachean Ethics spoke about just price as

91. Id.
92. James Gordley, Equality in Exchange, 69 Cal. L. Rev. 1587, 1608-09 (1981)
[hereinafter Gordley, Equality in Exchange].
93. In the quest to measure value, the difficulties in attempts to reduce market
volatility have been documented. See Robert Shiller, Market Volatility (1989)
(volatility is much greater than changes in dividends indicates); cf. Louis Lowenstein,
Sense and Nonsense in Corporate Finance 13 (1991) (observing that estimating the
right level for stock prices is hard, "given the lack of a sufficient basis for calculated
mathematical projections").
94. Michael Sandel, Liberalism and Its Critics 5-7 (1984). For an economic
approach to law, see Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 286 (5th ed. 1998)
("[E]conomics, in its normative dimension, can be thought of as a form of applied
utilitarianism."); A. Mitchell Polinsky, An Introduction to Law and Economics (2d
ed. 1989); Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 Hofstra
L. Rev. 509 (1980); Daniel A. Farber, Contract Theory and Modern Economic
Theory, 78 Nw. U. L. Rev. 303 (1983).
95. Randy E. Barnett, Contract Scholarship and the Reemergence of Legal
Philosophy, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1223, 1229 (1984); cf. Collins, supra note 56, at 3-7, 1113, 32. For criticism of Collins' naive faith in the market, see Jack M. Beerman,
Contract Law as a System of Values, 67 B.U. L. Rev. 553, 555 (1987) (reviewing Hugh
Collins, The Law of Contract (1986)). But see John Gray, The Moral Foundations of
Market Institutions (Institute of Economic Affairs Health and Welfare Unit 1992)
(taking into account the concerns of those who point out the injustices of the
unregulated market, emphasizing the moral basis of the market).
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explaining exchange transactions.96 Therefore, he was symbolically
credited with originating the notion of substantive fairness as the justice
of the exchange. 97 Adequacy of consideration and unconscionability law
are inspired by the Nicomachean Ethics.98 Heirs of Aristotle use
reasonable expectation, which "invites the resolution of contract
disputes by reference to external standards of reasonableness rather
than to the provisions of the contract itself," to channel Aristotle's
ideas.9 9 In short, consideration in the nineteenth century focused on the
process of making the agreement while by the end of that century
promissory estoppel looked toward expectations arising from
agreement. Agreement is a broader notion than bargain which shifts the
focus of the inquiry to the manner in which the parties reached their
agreement.l 0
Property and contracts together formed the bases of consent and
notions of agreement for autonomy and freedom of and from contract.
Historically, until Thomas Hobbes's Leviathan was published in 1651,
contract lay hidden under the shadow of property, which had been the
preeminent legal, philosophical and economic organizing principle. 101 In
1797, Kant wrote about the moral value of a fight to promise but Kant's
promises are noncontractarian: the duty to keep promises is a moral
imperative derived from the autonomy of the individual and the intrinsic
worth of each person.")2 Consent is merely evidentiary and does not
make that contract just or unjust."1 3 With the end of the industrial age
96. See, e.g., Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, in Introduction to Aristotle 403
(Richard McKeon ed., Modern Library 1947) ("[W]hat is just in distribution must be
according to merit .... "). Raymond de Roover deals with medieval just price theory.
Raymond de Roover, The Concept of the Just Price: Theory and Economic Policy, 18
J. Econ. Hist. 418 (1958).
97. Gordley, Equality in Exchange, supra note 92, at 1589; Barnett, supra note 12,
at 283-84.
98. Barnett, supra note 12, at 283-84.
99. Coote, supra note 15, at 103-04, 112. Compare Lord Russell's use of
reasonable standards in Williams, [1990] All. E.R. 524. In contrast, reliance "in
seeking to base contracts on injury suffered, points towards torts and restitution and
away from personal choice." Coote, supra note 15, at 112. Economic theorists
similarly direct our attention to torts and away from personal choice. See supra text
accompanying note 95.
100. Barnett, supra note 12, at 287.
101. Rosenfeld, supra note 56, at 791 (citing Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan 132
(Everyman's Library ed. 1973)). "Even as late as the eighteenth century, contract law
was subordinated to the law of property, serving primarily as a mode of transferring
title." Id. at 821.
102. Id. at 793 n.110, 862-63; see also Gary Lawson, Efficiency and Individualism,
42 Duke L.J. 53 (1.993); Ernest J. Weinrib, Corrective Justice, 77 Iowa L. Rev. 403, 424
(1992) (differentiating Kantian-Hegelian thoughts on private law relationships from
an Aristotelian perspective). In private law, Kant treats "from the standpoint of
action what Aristotle describes as a structure of interaction. With interaction as his
starting point, Aristotle elucidates the other-directedness of justice and links the
parties through the notion of equality." Weinrib, CorrectiveJustice, supra, at 424,
103. Compare this idea with Mansfield's notion that consideration was evidence of
an agreement. Oldham, supra note 36, at 1961.
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and the advent of the information age, the law needs to give contracting
parties the assurance that their updated methods of structuring their
relationships will be honored, using the underlying substance of general
agreement as the organizing principles for contract law.
Concepts of paternalism, reason, experience, and tradition are broad
standards repeated in different theories with slightly different meanings.
Like Adam, who named the animals, we enjoy inventing categories,
thereby suggesting that we have isolated a different concept under each
Simpson, Gilmore, and Dawson noticed this
new category.
phenomenon in relation to offer, acceptance, and consideration on
modification and discharge. Assent, intent, and consent are all various
versions of the nineteenth-century notion of agreement, cut down: each
scholar chooses a word and invests it with particular significance for the
theory in question. Categories proliferate because many people are not
connected to what everyone else is doing. In other words, those who do
not know the existing theories and their meaning are condemned to
repeat them with different words.
CONCLUSION: PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL'S PLACE IN TRADITIONAL
CONTRACT LAW

When mainstream judicial and legal opinions focus on the equitable
aspects of a transaction, as Corbin suggested happened in the years
before the Restatement,"14 the major vehicle for contracts liability is
expanded to accommodate that notion received from the values of the
community at large. If, instead, as in the nineteenth century, conditions
in society restrict the circumstances under which contractual obligations
are deemed to exist, the validity of the contracting process itself and the
voluntary nature of contract law are emphasized. Corbin wanted to
retreat from some of the most severe pruning of nineteenth-century
contract law and set it back on its course from that point." 5 "Promissory
estoppel" is a version of the broad concept of consideration, or in
Simpson's terminology, is one of many considerations. Only its new,
equitable name concealed its origins in consideration, perhaps to protect
it from those in the ascendancy who denied its role in contract. When
the common law grew too stiff or narrow, equity often came to the
rescue, allowing old doctrines to survive with changed names.
Promissory estoppel is simply consideration, cloaked in a new name.
104. Corbin, Recent Developments, supra note 19, at 453.
105. According to Professor Baker, at common law, "relationships are governed by
rules rather than by uncertain notions of fairness." Baker, Reasonable Expectation,
supra note 15, at 35. Are we back to the choice of imperfect laws or broad standards
exercised under the discretion of just judges? Priestly suggests we may choose both:
"whether or not there is one satisfactory theory capable of explaining contract
decisions in a consistent way, the fact is that the cases and the contract texts are full of
rules of the most detailed kind relating to contractual situations which are used at
least as a guide by the legal profession and the courts .... " Priestly, supra note 80, at
31.
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The rise of promissory estoppel in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries shows how inventive the law was when the notion
became dominant that contract liability was limited only to bargained
detriment. The disfavored idea of unbargained detriment was expressed
in a different way, as the House of Lords did in Hughes v. Metropolitan
Railway.'16 That is, when consideration was limited to bargained
detriment, the remaining functions of the full learning of consideration
were channeled into another set of concepts, most notably "promissory
estoppel." Succeeding generations of lawyers simply did not remember
that the new terminology embodied the concept of consideration their
ancestors disfavored. That return to a more accommodative theory is
the genius of the Restatement of Contracts, which permitted inclusion of
other definitions of consideration besides the one describing the favored
bargained-for exchange, although these other definitions of
consideration had to travel incognito under separate section numbers
and without acknowledgment of their heritage in consideration.' °7
Scholarly concentration on the different channels that opened up in
the nineteenth century after consideration was cut down created its own
new splintering allegiances. We have invested emotionally in some of
these notions, and that may keep us from seeing congruences and
identities between the concepts. It is therefore no surprise to find the
frequent observation in contract scholarship that the unity of
nineteenth-century classical contract law is gone. Nostalgia for its unity,
if not for its doctrines, is still a common sentiment among contract
scholars. On the one hand, Fried jettisons what he considers ancillary
provisions intruding from other fields of law to reach pure contract in
the distilled essence of the moral promise; on the other hand, many fear
the death of contract by its absorption into delictual and restitutional
remedies. The Restatement, which provides a general gauge of the
vibrancy and reasonability of our broad approach to contracts, reflects
the journey of contract law during the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries.
The Restatement, like Cardozo's characterization of an agreement,
"'instinct with an obligation' imperfectly expressed," sets forth a
basically contractual, broad definition of consideration, "[n]ot
withstanding its semi-delictual overtones." ' 8 The remedial edge of
106. Cf.Hughes v. Metropolitan Railway, (1877) 2 App. Cas. 439, [1874-80] All E.
R. Rep. 187.
107. Randy E. Barnett, Foreward:Is Reliance Still Dead?, 38 San Diego L. Rev. 1, 3
n.6 (2001) (stating that "a large part of [promissory estoppel] ... l[ies] squarely within
contract law"). But cf.Eric M. Holmes, The Four Phases of Promissory Estoppel, 20
Seattle U. L. Rev. 45, 48 (1996) (strongly supporting the continued need for equitable
relief recognized independently as promissory estoppel).
108. Judge Benjamin N. Cardozo made the statement in Moran v. Standard Oil
Co., 105 N.E. 217 (N.Y. 1914) ("There are times when reciprocal engagements do not
fit each other, like the parts of an indented deed, and yet the whole contract... may
be 'instinct with... an obligation' imperfectly expressed.") and Wood v. Lucy, Lady
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bargain, reliance, benefit conferred, and equity does not devalue the
content of contract law in its promissory, detrimental, or moral
obligations, for those notions of promise, need, and benefit have always
been the ties that bind us to contract. The remedial edge merely means
that to be complete, contract must include not only theories of liability
but also relief, resolution, and reconciliation. °9 In view of the difficulty
the world over "in developing any general basis at all for enforcing
promises, it is perhaps less remarkable that the common law developed
a theory that is logically flawed than that it succeeded in developing any
theory at all.''. The flaw lies in our desire to cut down the role of one
or two of the elements in contract at the expense of the balance
produced by recognizing the roles of promise, benefit, and need in an
integrated theory.
The history of liability in contracts demonstrates the purpose the
doctrines of consideration, benefit, and detriment served at different
points in time. The same battle is fought again and again, giving rise to
the many lives of contract, as successive generations realize for
themselves what their ancestors learned. The point of these successive
battles is quite clear and consistent. If, however, one element becomes
dominant in the mixture (for example, as benefit did in the nineteenth
century) at the expense of other elements, the subordinated concepts
may be expected to go underground and re-emerge with new names.
Duff-Gordon, 1.18 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917) ("The law has outgrown its primitive stage of
formalism when the precise word was the sovereign talisman, and every slip was fatal.
It takes a broader view today. A promise may be lacking, and yet the whole writing
may be 'instinct with an obligation,' imperfectly expressed. If that is so, there is a
contract." (citing Scott, J. in McCall Co. v. Wright, 117 N.Y.S. 775 (1878))). The
second phrase is quoted from Samuel J. Stoljar, Estoppel and Contract Theory, 3 J.
Cont. L. 1, 22 n.97 (1990).
Corbin has stated that the term "Restatement" is not a misnomer. See Corbin,
Sixty-Eight Years, supra note 1, at 186-87. Law is in fact uniformity of conduct. "In
spite of complexity, in spite of some diversity and conflict, there is in fact a high
degree of uniformity; and the predictions of a broadly educated lawyer are worth
buying." Klau, supra note 52, at 528-29. Moreover, the Weight of Authority is also
the Weight of Uniformity, of which law is constituted. See id. Much of the confusion
and conflict in the law is directly due to a confused and variable terminology; and one
of the major problems of the American Law Institute is the clarification of our
fundamental legal concepts by the use of a uniform and definite terminology.
109. See Randy Barnett, The Death of Reliance, 46 J. Legal Educ. 518 (1996);
Richard Craswell, Against Fuller and Perdue, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 99 (2000); Charles L.
Knapp, Rescuing Reliance: The Perils of Promissory Estoppel, 49 Hastings L.J. 1191
(1998) (dealing with current trends in contracts scholarship). For example, Craswell's
version of modern contract theory focuses on the assessment of damages, not on the
parties' respective interests when the contract was formed. Result reigns, not
circumstance. Among modern priorities, Craswell cites economic efficiency,
retributivist and distributional goals as considerations that do not always coincide
with Fuller and Perdue's classification. Id. at 1199-1200; see also Andrew Kull,
Disgorgement for Breach, the "Restitution Interest," and the Restatement of Contracts,
79 Tex. L. Rev. 2021 (2001).
110. E. Allan Farnsworth, The Past of Promise: An Historical Introduction to
Contract, 69 Colum. L. Rev. 576, 599 (1969).

2002]

CONTRACTUAL TIES THATBIND PARTIES

Thus, the need for a wide notion of consideration as it appeared in the
In Lord
sixteenth century found expression again and again.
Mansfield's time when consideration grew narrow, the concepts of
moral obligation and equity were treated expansively. Under the
Victorian law lords, when bargain appeared exclusive, equitable
estoppel was expanded. During the twentieth century in the wake of
freedom of contract, promissory estoppel "flourished like the green bay
tree," as Grant Gilmore was fond of saying. The underlying thread of
broad contracts liability was often obscured but it held the garment of
contract together as composed of promise, benefit, and need. This
history should give us courage to pay heed to the functions balanced in
the integrated theory of contract liability and prune away whatever
duplication in terminology and thought obscures recognition of these
basic contract needs. The same impulses to raise one element over the
other, which gave rise to our duplicative terminology in the first place,
will not wane, however, assuring contracts of at least nine lives.
Corbin optimistically trusted in the then new American Law Institute
to clear up these difficulties, despite the fact that he and Williston had
difficulty getting the other Restaters to accept informal contracts as
binding without assent or consideration, even in the face of judicial
acceptance of these arrangements as contracts. This treatment of the
history of liability in contracts traces Corbin's theory in the original
treatise. Perillo and Bender's volume in the revised edition departs
from that vision but is true to Corbin's desire to unify and simplify the
theory of liability in contracts while retaining the core concepts as the
law evolves. With that, Corbin, if he were with us, should have been
pleased. 1

111. Corbin observed that
The author is not downgrading the "authority" of his own treatise
when he invites every reader to make a critical study of the sources
on which its many "tentative working rules" are based ....
[S]tudents and writers and other judges will create new rules and
principles and doctrines to modify and supplant those that have
served earlier days. What industry, what clarity of mind, and what
nobility of conscience are required in this judicial process!
Corbin, Sixty-Eight Years, supra note 1, at 195.
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